Contemporary Social Theory

“Much like ’safe sex’, sticking to description protects against the transmission of explanations” ?

Let’s think about the differences between two anthropological methodologies by comparing and contrasting AN and Extended Case method. We can do that by looking at the principles of EC, as outlined by Michael Burawoy in his book THE EXTENDED CASE METHOD.

Why don’t we take a look at the first five minutes of this footage, ending with Jane Goodall greeting a human crowd in Tanzanian chimp: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=51z7WRDjOjM

A few recap questions you should be able to answer at this point in the course:

1. What is the “petit bourgeois”, why is s/he in a privileged position to understand power games?

2. What is, typically, the most important difference between a game and other social interactions?

3. When is a field autonomous?

4. Define tradition, using the notion of “cultural capital” OR “cultural tool kit”.

5. Cite five concepts (that you learned in the theory course) permitting to think/discuss/explain social change.

6. If it is correct that all social interactions are strategic exchanges in market-like situations, what is a gift?

7. What is the most decisive argument in favor of rights-based politics?

8. What is the difference between typical Marxist analysis and Bourdieu-an sociology?

Time flies. Freddie and Attila, thanks for the incredibly rich comments you posted on this page below, following our meeting on Week 2 (language, action, practice). It seems we have new lines of inquiry to explore. Everyone can look at the Week 4 page to see what is the plan for the Feb 3 meeting.
Week 3 was about agency, structuration and institutions. We watched a lot of visual material, talked about laughter in comedy, laughter in everyday life, and breaching experiments. We started the conversation about authority in institutions, to be pursued tomorrow with Freddie’s memo on symbolic power. As an example of how to use Ann Swidler’s tool kit theory (TKT) of culture, Georgi offered the Danish controversy over caricatures of a religious figure. It was a chance to stress the difference between the traditional and the TK theory of culture. We realized that traditionalism is an attitude rather than an attribute that results from situated choices made by specific groups–in this case more particularly, a group of cartoonists supported by a system of secular, professional media, and a Muslim constituency with specific class, national and organizational backgrounds. We mapped possible directions for a research of this “case”. Nil and Zoltan pointed at other possible religious-civic positionalities producing different opinions than the ones we know of through the media.
Maria says she has a problem with culture being “out there” for manipulation as a kit of tools. What exactly is problematic for you Maria? The supposed externality of culture? Its instrumentality? The strategic character of agents according to this theory?
“So”, said Nil, “is everything cultural then?” What is exactly the objection underlying the question?

In her memo on rites of institutionalization, Isabel asks about “people who avoid to institutionalize of their identity: is this due to accident or agency?” We’d need examples to reflect on this question, it’s a good one. Let’s try to discuss it when we make it to the question of structuration.

In her presentation of the frame concept, Irma introduced a very important questions: “To what extent can frames be negotiated by participants and to what extent are they applied mechanically? Do all individuals have the same opportunities to choose the frames they use and to negotiate them?” She adds: “One can allege that people with little social power have little power to frame events or to combat interpretative frameworks applied to them.” We need Cheonghee’s insight in the use of frames in the analysis of social movements. What do you say of her critical remark that “SMOs [in the frame alignment theory] seem to behave like product sellers”?

Zoltan and Joe should tell us a word of power in Goffman’s and Berger/Luckman’s views of interaction.

In our sessions of Week 2, some previous questions were answered or partly answered, and several new ones were asked in the course the the discussion. Here they are for further thinking!

What is Bourdieu’s problem with linguistics, Alex asked? That was a question addressing Chapter 1 of LSP. In her memo-presentation, Daria gave a clear (if perhaps not complete) answer: linguistics presents a skewed view of language as disembedded from social relations and, more particularly, immune to power relations. Thanks Daria for the clear memo. Is this all though? There’s a couple more things to say about Bourdieu’s critique of linguistics, that are important because they tie up to his critique of other disciplines, economics in particular.

Following up our discussion of “habitus”,  Nil asked: is there something like an arch-habitus, a structure of talk and behavior that organizes and conditions all other habitus-es? Bourdieu would answer: yes, there is probably something like a national habitus, indexed on official language, which conditions important aspects of class, gender, sexual, ethnic/racial cultures. The state (an organizational complex including legal, educational, and repressive organizations) has been historically the organizing principle of this arch-habitus. Can you come up with other answers, or with a critique of this very Bourdieu-an answer?

How Marxian is Bourdieu, we wondered following Nadiya’s remark that “Bourdieu is Marxist”? Big question actually, since it is unclear what “Marxist” or “Marxian” is in the first place…

Freddie said: “Bourdieu’s market theory of culture/symbolic exchange takes him really close to rational choice theory.” Hmmm. That’s a good one!  But didn’t we find Bourdieu furiously Marxist a minute earlier? Can you think of a more contradictory characterization of a theorist than “he’s a marxist and a rational choice theorist”? So: how rational-choice is Bourdieu’s market theory of the social? Or to put it differently: how rational is the Bourdieu-an subject? (The question is really provocative theoretically speaking because it puts forward the deep contradictions that define familiar critiques of PB’s work: at times a marx-izant social determinist giving no space to “agency”, at times dangerously close to RCT through an overly strategic understanding of social action!)

Following up on Bourdieu’s (French inflected) example of the “r” phoneme as a marker of distinction, Zoltan brought up the example of linguistic differences between “Arab” and “European” Jews in contemporary Israel, explaining that the racial-symbolic boundary that separates speakers of Arabic and speakers of Hebrew is being reproduced among the dominant group of Hebrew speakers. Could you come up with an interesting example of a hierarchizing and structuring linguistic boundary from “back home” that we could analyze (or simply question) in class?

On the game-like nature of social relations and interactions, according to Wittgenstein, Sergiu said “OK, but chess is a simpler game than other social games, it is a matter of probabilities.” Since in fact all outcomes in social life are a matter of probabilities as well, in what sense is a game of chess simpler, or just different, from other social interactions?

That’s it for now folks! Now sign up as a member to this blog and let us thank you for your answers and comments!

NB. Readings are posted on the e-learning site. The people presenting and writing memos for week 3 are here.

We hope you will engage in heated debates and enjoy the semester!